While things go a little crazy

September 17, 2008

I’ve been looking back at my performance in 2006 and 2007, years where I drastically underperformed the commodity-heavy TSX and dallied around the S&P 500, and it’s amazing to recall trades that I don’t remember doing, or trades that I made but which, in hindsight, are totally at odds with my core tenets when buying or selling equities. At least three times during that period I went predominantly into cash, only to succumb to the siren song of “doing something”. Each time, sitting pat would have done me more favours. Although I had some big winners in those years, my profitability was undercut by these haphazard and ill-considered trades, often done with very little insight into market structure or sentiment. As I get older, this awareness of the overarching market becomes more important and stronger in me (I think?).

In 2004, another year which performance I was unhappy with, I recall exactly what led to it. I had done very well the year before, and was telling this to a friend of mine who, sitting on a substantial cash hoard, asked me to manage it. Being a neophyte in those areas (still am, in my opinion), I tried for several months, but was unhappy managing someone else’s money. I ceded control back to him, and he proceeded to dabble and then wholeheartedly trade while I was still under the impression I was a “medium-term investor” and buying Benjamin Graham reprints. Since I’m only human, I’d hear about the big gains (never the losses) that my friend would make, and how he was pulling money out of the markets like nobody’s business. It started to affect how I made my decisions, and I started to do things like daytrade and hold very short-term positions, things I had never done up to that point. Now, that might be a profitable way to work for some, but for me it was poison to my account, and that year I barely eked out a gain. My friend went on to lose the bulk of his account on a highly leveraged trade; he came back a year later with an additional sum he had kept back (”never to be touched”) and saw the bulk of it disappear when his large holdings of VIX options expired worthless. I’ve never been touched by a substantial loss that has blown me out, thankfully, and I hope that by living vicariously through him I won’t have to experience it firsthand, although I suspect it’s a difference in our temperaments that was a major factor.

That said, that doesn’t explain 2006 or 2007, most of which happened because I wanted the feel of “being in the market” without the work of actually watching regularly what was going on, seeing what factors were influencing it, and devoting real attention to it. Part of it was that I was working a job that took a lot of focus and didn’t allow for that kind of attention; one of those was going to suffer, and in the end it was my investing. It’s only now, that I’ve started to shift that balance, that I feel I have a better grasp of things. I’m a poor short-term trader, I am sure of it now, and don’t enjoy its tick-by-tick lifestyle. I like the bigger picture, the vast global interplay of factors, only a few of which I might have a handle on. Nobody knows everything (or anything, if William Goldman is to be believed). It’s been an interesting past while. I don’t consider myself an investor in the vein of Warren Buffett anymore, if I ever did, and it feels weird to have my site named as it is, but I’m not really a “trader” either. Is there something in between?

On a related note, I’ve started reading the various Market Wizards books by Jack Schwager, which have been recommended by various people I know. They’re interesting books, in that they expose you to the philosophy and personality of various traders, successful at the time of writing. The earliest of the three from 1989, Market Wizards, contains the most profiles of “old hand” traders, many of whom are still doing well. The latest one from 2001, Stock Market Wizards (not to be confused with The New Market Wizards (1992) — Schwager obviously likes his brand, maybe a little too much), is in some ways more interesting to me because it contains interviews with less well-known traders. One of them, Michael Lauer (mentioned here), was indicted on fraud earlier this year, while some are untraceable, even to Google’s all-seeing eye.

The guy that stands out for me from the last book is Stuart Walton, who current runs Trek Capital. I identify a lot with his story; there are a lot of things I see in myself, notably his interest in writing and drawing and the ability or need to work alone. The main difference to me is that he started really trading during the boom years of the 90s (a.k.a. the years when people quit their jobs to trade because it was “easy money”), after numerous failures and false starts, and did very well until 1999, when his Reindeer fund at the time took a loss for the year and he closed shop. (The performance is here in PDF form.) He then started a new fund, which lost 35% for the year, closed that, and now his latest, open since 2002, appears to still be viable. I wonder if the techniques and philosophies he developed in boom times are still serving him well or if he’s adjusted? I feel like he must have, much like I have — that’s the market, a movable feast.

(Similarly, I recently read Andy Kessler’s book, Running Money, another guy who ran a fund from the mid-90s to 1999 and then shuttered it — funny how that worked! I guess I have to give them credit for realizing when they couldn’t keep making people money.)

It does make me wonder about hedge funds, though — it’s been pointed out quite often that there’s a confirmation bias at work with them, where the indices that measure them often don’t factor in survival rate. For me, it would be instructive to revisit some of these traders, rather than solely interviewing them at the top of their game. Maybe there’s an epilogue and I haven’t gotten to it yet. It reminds me a little of the issue I have with the financial media, from major news outlets to bloggers — things can be said, analysis made, without any accountability at a later date. So rarely do people revisit the stuff to see what one’s track record really says.


Eight Diagram Pole Fighter

September 9, 2008

Terrific account of the mindstate of a forex trader who can’t unhook himself from a trade that consumes him. The more leverage, the more terror and elation, I suppose.


Icahn Ought

August 30, 2008

Interesting article by Joe Nocera (the editor of Smartest Guys in the Room) about Carl Icahn’s reputation as “an activist investor” and his dealings at XO Communications. “Activism” in this case meaning to the benefit of the bulk of shareholders, which I find a somewhat degraded version of the word already.

Guys like Carl Icahn like net operating losses. If they can get their hands on them — which they can if they control 80 percent of the company with the losses — they can apply the losses against their corporate tax bill. So in November 2005, at a time when XO’s stock was around $3 a share, Mr. Icahn proposed the following deal: He would buy the company’s fiber optic assets for $700 million and take the net operating losses as well. The other XO shareholders would be left with the worthless wireless frequency — and they would have to use most of the $700 million to pay off the debt it owed to … Carl Icahn!

Let’s dwell on this for a minute. In his role as board chairman, Mr. Icahn was telling XO’s shareholders that it was in their best interests to sell. And yet, he was also saying that it was in his best interest to buy. It couldn’t really be both. Naturally, Mr. Icahn’s cronies on the board agreed to the deal. R2 Investments, however, reacted by filing a lawsuit, claiming that Mr. Icahn and the board were violating their fiduciary duty to the company’s shareholders.


A day in the sun

August 14, 2008

Solar stocks have been a big sector in the past year or so, although to be honest I have been out of the loop with them as they took off in the wake of rising oil prices and the increased emphasis on alternate forms of energy. That said, I started to take an interest in Timminco in April or May, I believe, when there were reports of a major short seller disputing a lot of the claims of the company. I’m not always quick to listen to the various talking heads that get quoted in media reports, but I’ve found a lot of short sellers do a lot more research about companies — obviously, publicizing their doubts would have helped them in their quest to profit, but there was enough there that I started to wonder myself.

Since then, Timminco appears to be not as pretty as people thought, with the head of the solar silicon division and the guy whose name is on their process patents, Rene Boisvert, claiming that people were overreacting by selling the stock (it dropped about 24% on Tuesday). For me, the best part of the article I linked is the reaction from a Sprott fund manager; Eric Sprott and co. were the biggest proponents of Timminco on its rise from penny stock to 2007’s stock market darling:

Yet even Timminco’s biggest backer, Sprott Asset Management Inc., is now taking some money off the table. At least one portfolio manager at the investment firm, which in May said it owned 17 per cent of Timminco’s stock, is reducing his position.

Fund manager Jean-François Tardif, who oversees three funds housed under the Sprott Opportunities Hedge Fund banner, says Timminco once made up 4 per cent of his portfolio but is now down to just 0.6 per cent after he sold the company’s shares in June and July.

“I sold most of my stuff on the way up and that’s my style,” Mr. Tardif said.

Perhaps something isn’t being conveyed in quotation, but how awesomely nonchalant is that quote? Isn’t this a tacit admission that he thinks the stock isn’t going to go up anymore? I mean, if you really believe in the future of this stock, with its talk of this super effective and cheap method to produce solar silicon from metallurgic-grade silicon, why would you sell off the bulk of your position? I mean, if the forecasts of Timminco are true, it would be worth a great deal more, no? To me, this signals a lack of faith and/or an ability to capitalize on hype.

Anyhow, I will continue to watch this stock and be entertained.


In any kind of weather

July 29, 2008

I suppose the following analogies have been used to describe the different kinds of personalities that are involved with the market, but I do like how they capture some of the essential philosophical differences and timeframes. I lump them into three general categories: the surfers, the fishermen and the farmers.

There are numerous day-traders or people who came up in the business scalping profits and several of the ones I’ve seen blog are avid surfers; I think of the short-termers as the most like surfers: looking for waves, patterns, breaks, occasionally caught up in the churn or dragged under and, if lucky and with a bit of intuitive skill, they might catch a big move and ride it for a glorious gain. But it’s all “of the moment,” and often depends on prevailing factors and a fair amount of reaction. The older surfers still enjoy it but they aren’t quite as flashy on their boards.

The mid-termers aren’t looking for the small fry but set up with a general idea, much like the fisherman who heads to particular waters at a particular time of day and waits. They don’t catch a ton of fish but the ones that they do are good eating and sometimes there’s even one for the record books. Sometimes they don’t catch anything, though, but it still is enjoyable enough to fish, provided it’s just for sport and not their livelihood.

Then there are those that aren’t really interested in the vacillations of the market, like the farmer who plants seeds when the soil is fertile and then lets nature sort itself out. This kind keeps an eye on their crop, but for the most part just remains patient and hopes for excellent weather. Pretty consistently, there’s a nice crop to harvest, but some years there’s too much rain and conditions are bad and the farmer can’t do much but wait till next year and hunker down for the winter.


Joey Knish

July 16, 2008

One of the things I’ve dealt with in depth as a trader is what has been termed in psychology circles as “the anchoring effect”. It comes into play most often for me when I look at my total portfolio value and watch it progress, as it has in recent days, relatively quickly. Each new high pushes the mental peg up in my mind, and makes each subsequent drop, even to a level a few days or a week ago, somewhat painful. Obviously, this is something that should be conquered to be successful in the markets, and I would not say that its effect is particularly notable in me, but it’s sort of a minor reflection of the attitude a lot of people have to markets and trading — the wish for a constant upward progression (whether that’s in the form of a stable and steady salary, or the skyward trajectory of a bubble) and the inability to cope in the face of any change of direction.

One of the beautiful things about trading and being a trader is the way that it teaches you mental flexibility and an ability to accept when the market is going against you and not trying to create justifications for unprofitable positions. I found that as an investor (in the sense of putting the fundamentals and belief that you are “investing in the business” a la Buffett above market machinations and doing “what works”) this is important but becomes even more magnified in importance for active trading.


Banksy revealed!

July 14, 2008

This is a pretty good “scoresheet” of US government intervention into the various travails of the banking world. Personally, I think there’s only so much intervention that will work here; it’s like putting a million band-aids on something that just needs time and a high fever to work itself out of the system.